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1 Introduction 
A well-designed policy for renewable energy should be effective, in that it gives developers 
enough money to persuade them to make use of the country’s resources, and it should be 
efficient, in that it does not give them more than is necessary for this.  Research for the 
European Commission has found that “well-adapted feed in tariff regimes [were] generally 
the most efficient and effective support schemes for promoting renewable electricity” 
(European Commission, 2008, page 3, original emphasis). 
For example, Germany had used a feed-in tariff to develop just over 15% of its onshore wind 
resource by 2006, while generators had an expected profit of less than €10 per MWh.  In 
contrast, the UK had used a quota scheme and had (by the same time) developed under 5% 
of its onshore wind resource while giving developers an estimated average profit of almost 
€70 per MWh (ibid, Figure 1).  The UK appears to have learned the lesson, introducing a 
feed-in tariff for smaller schemes in 2010, while a key part of its current Electricity Market 
Reform package should act like a feed-in tariff in fixing the price of power from renewable 
generators.  A price of £100/MWh has been proposed for electricity from onshore wind 
(DECC, 2013). 
DECC’s analysis supporting this price is based around wind farms with an average load 
factor, however.  For any technology with a high proportion of fixed costs, the level of output 
relative to capacity is a crucial determinant of its average costs.  A wind farm with a high 
load factor can cover its costs with a lower price per unit of output than one at an average 
site.  The German feed-in tariff recognises this, giving higher payments to farms in relatively 
worse locations during the middle years of their lives.  This may sound illogical as it gives an 
incentive to develop on sub-optimal sites; however, our national ambition for renewable 
energy penetration requires these sites to be developed, and so we need to pay the 
developers enough to cover the costs of doing so.  If we then pay the same amount per kWh 
to developers with better sites and higher output levels, this will give them more money than 
they need to cover their costs.  That money may not stay with the developer – the landowner 
may be able to charge a higher rent for placing a wind turbine on a windy site than on one 
that is calmer – but it is money that the consumer has had to give up, even though this was 
not necessary to make developing that wind farm a good idea.  In economists’ terms, “rent” 
is exactly the right term to use for the excessive payment, and a lower tariff would be 
sufficient to stimulate investment. 
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The aim of this paper is to estimate the economic rents that may be created in the UK by the 
use of undifferentiated strike prices for onshore wind.  We model the output of every wind 
farm that is currently under construction of has planning permission, estimating the annual 
load factors they could expect based on the last 30 years of weather patterns, which is the 
key determinant of whether the strike price will be too generous.  
Given DECC’s central estimate of wind farm costs, we were not surprised to see that a strike 
price of £100/MWh allows a farm with an typical UK load factor (28%) to cover those costs 
over the 15-year life of a contract, without earning excessive rents.  We are also able to 
check that the likely year-to-year variability in wind speeds and output, which will sometimes 
reduce the station’s earnings, are still compatible with a debt-heavy capital structure that can 
bring down the pre-tax cost of capital.  We note, however, that since the wind farm’s life is 
likely to be greater than 15 years, the lucky owner will be able to earn a healthy profit selling 
power at the wholesale market price from a fully-depreciated plant with low variable costs 
after the contract has ended. 
Our analysis suggests that farms built at less windy sites would not be profitable if they had 
costs equal to DECC’s central case and a strike price of £100/MWh.  Those with lower costs 
(perhaps because their ground conditions are more favourable than those of the average UK 
farm used to set the strike price) may go ahead, but we would be surprised if any farms were 
built with a prospect of losing money.  In other words, we would expect the rents earned by 
rational wind farm owners to have a lower limit of zero, and the number of farms actually 
built may be below expectations. 
Conversely, farms at windier sites will be able to recover significantly more than their 
expected costs over the 15-year life of the contract. We estimate that these rents – 
payments from consumers above those required to make the investment viable – would be 
around £100 million per year, with a present value (discounted at 5%) of just over £1 billion.  
This number may be small in the context of the overall cost of wind energy, but it is still a 
sizeable amount in absolute terms. 
The next section of the paper describes the support schemes used in Germany and planned 
for the UK.  Section 3 explains our wind modelling and other data.  Section 4 presents our 
calculations of the rents which UK wind farms may earn under the reform, and the final 
section concludes. 
 
2 Support Schemes for Renewable Energy 
Germany reformed its system for supporting renewable generation in 2000, when the 
Renewable Energy Act, the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG), came into force.  During 
the 1990s, electricity utilities had been obliged to buy power from renewable generators and 
pay them 90% of the average price paid for electricity by end consumers.  When this price 
declined towards the end of the decade, new investment became unviable (Butler and 
Neuhoff, 2008).  The EEG replaced these potentially variable payments with fixed tariffs, 
differentiated by technology and set for 20 years in nominal terms.  From 2002 onwards, the 
payment rates for new projects were due to fall each year, although once a project started 
generating, its rates were fixed.  From time to time, the schedule of rates due to come into 
force has been adjusted. 
3 
Wind projects have two payment rates.  For a project starting in 2012, there is a basic rate of 
€48.70 per MWh and an initial rate of €89.30 per MWh1.  All turbines receive the initial rate 
for at least five years, but this period is extended on a site-specific basis, comparing the 
actual load factor and the so-called “reference yield”.  This reference yield is defined as the 
output that the farm’s turbines would be able to produce at a site with an average wind 
speed of 5.5 metres per second at 30 metres above the ground.2  For 1 MW turbines, the 
reference yield averages 25%, while 2 MW turbines have a reference yield averaging 28%.   
A farm which achieves 150% or more of the reference yield will only receive the higher initial 
payment for 5 years, and will then revert to the basic rate for the remaining 15 years of its 
contract.  The period for which the initial rate applies is increased by one year per 4.5% by 
which the actual yield falls short of 150% of the reference yield.  A farm which only achieves 
the reference yield will receive the higher payment for just over 16 years, while a farm will be 
paid at the higher rate for the full twenty years if its output is 82% of the reference yield or 
less.  However, the system has a lower limit in that the transmission operator does not need 
to accept the power unless the developer can prove (before commissioning) that it expects 
to achieve an output at least equal to 60% of the reference yield.  Figure 1 shows how this 
affects the lifetime average revenue and the net present value of the generator’s output.  It 
means that a developer (or its landowner) on a windy site can expect to earn more than one 
with a poor site, but the rents are shared with electricity consumers. 
 
Figure 1: The effective average price (left hand scale) and lifetime revenue (right hand scale) 
of German wind farms as a function of their load factor (normalised for 2MW turbines). 
Support for renewable energy in the UK has followed three models in the last two decades 
and a fourth is now planned.  At the electricity industry’s pre-privatisation restructuring in 
1990, the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation was introduced.  This levy on consumers’ bills was 
                                               
1 The initial rate is raised to €94.10 for turbines able to provide “system services” such as frequency response, 
reactive power and the ability to ride through the effects of faults elsewhere on the system. 
2 While the reference yield might be calculated from first principles (the wind speed distribution, adjusted for hub 
height) and the turbine’s power curve, the yields are in fact listed at http://www.wind-
fgw.de/eeg_referenzertrag.htm.  
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mainly to pay for the cost of nuclear decommissioning (not properly provided for by the 
nationalised industry), but a scheme to support renewable energy was added.  Would-be 
developers submitted bids in a number of tender rounds, held at irregular intervals in 
England and Wales, in Scotland and in Northern Ireland.  The cheapest schemes within 
each technology group were offered fixed-price contracts – in the later rounds, these were 
for fifteen years.  The main problem affecting the NFFO was that developers could submit 
bids before obtaining planning permission (thus reducing the cost of bidding into an auction 
with uncertain results) and a significant proportion of their schemes were never actually 
developed. 
The main current scheme for supporting renewable generators is the Renewables 
Obligation, introduced in 2002.  Generators receive Renewables Obligation Certificates 
(ROCs) in proportion to their output, and retailers are required to surrender ROCs in 
proportion to the power they supply, or to pay a buy-out charge.  The buy-out charge 
revenue is recycled to the retailers holding ROCs, giving each ROC a value equal to the 
buy-out charge, plus its share of the recycled revenue.3  The generator is also responsible 
for selling its power, which can be a separate transaction from the sale of its ROCs, although 
many sell both together.   
The number of ROCs available has generally fallen short of the government’s targets, 
ensuring that the market value of a ROC exceeds the buy-out price.  This is most likely due 
to the difficulty of getting planning consent for wind turbines, which has meant that fewer 
farms have been completed than would have been economically attractive.  At first, all 
generators received the same number of ROCs per MWh generated, which meant that some 
low-cost technologies were very profitable, and high-cost technologies were unviable.  To 
allow the development of the higher-cost technologies, without giving excessive rents to 
lower-cost generators, the government started to allocate ROCs in bands for new projects in 
2009.  For projects commissioned in 2013-14, for example, onshore wind generators will 
receive 0.9 ROCs per MWh generated, while offshore wind generators will receive 2 ROCs 
per MWh.  Onshore schemes commissioned before April 2013 would have received 1 ROC 
per MWh, and will continue to do so.  The banding reviews, held every four years, are 
intended to align the number of certificates so that each technology can cover its likely cost, 
given expectations for energy prices and certificate values. 
The Renewables Obligation still had two perceived problems.  First, the task of obtaining and 
trading certificates was burdensome for small organisations.  Second, the generator’s 
revenues depended on volatile market prices for both ROCs and electricity, and so the risks 
were much higher than with the NFFO’s fixed prices.  The government addressed the first 
problem by introducing a feed-in tariff for smaller schemes (those with a capacity below 5 
MW) from 2010. 
Electricity Market Reform was announced in December 2010 to address several perceived 
problems related to investment in generation.  An Emissions Performance Standard would 
prevent unabated coal stations from being built, while a Carbon Price Support would be a 
                                               
3 The buy-out charge was initially £30/ROC, and each ROC represented 1 MWh of renewable electricity.  If 
annual demand was 400 TWh and suppliers were required to source 4% of their power from renewable sources, 
there would be demand for 16m ROCs.  If renewable generation was only 3% of total demand, providing 12 
million ROCs, then each of the 12m ROCs held would attract the buy-out charge  from ⅓ of a ROC (4m shortfall 
divided by 12m presented), and the overall value would be £40 per ROC. 
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variable tax intended to bring the sum of the tax and the price of permits in the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme onto a preset, and steeply rising, path.  A Capacity Mechanism can be 
introduced if there appears to be a shortage of investment in conventional generation, 
required to deal with periods of low wind output, but likely to have relatively low (and perhaps 
otherwise uneconomic) load factors. 
To reduce the price risks faced by low-carbon generators with largely fixed costs, the 
government announced a Feed-in Tariff with Contracts for Differences.  Generators would 
have to sell their power in the wholesale market, but would receive (or pay back) the 
difference between the strike price in the contract and a reference price from the market.  
The strike price is known in advance; the reference price is intended to reflect the amount 
the generator actually achieves from selling its power.  If the generator actually receives the 
reference price, its overall earnings are fixed at the level of the strike price. 
For onshore wind generators, the government has announced a strike price of £100/MWh for 
schemes starting generation in 2016.  The reference price will be the hour-by-hour price in a 
day-ahead auction for electricity, and a wind farm that offers its output in this auction should 
be able to receive exactly this price for the amount offered.  The station faces a small 
volume risk, in that its offer to the market must be based on a forecast of its output, and if its 
actual generation is different, it may be penalised through the Balancing Mechanism.4  The 
top-up under its contract will be based on its actual output, with adjustments made for 
periods when the transmission system operator has requested the station to reduce output 
because of transmission or other constraints. 
The prices are intended to be “consistent with the Renewables Obligation levels of support 
(though adjusted down as the CfD protects the investor against additional risks)” (DECC, 
2013, para 12).  For onshore wind schemes, the Renewables Obligation used a hurdle rate 
of 9.6%, and a load factor of 28.6%.  There appears to be no analysis of how different load 
factors would affect the costs of wind generators, and the impact this could have on the 
support they need.  We provide this analysis in the next sections. 
  
3 Wind Speed Data and Analysis 
To estimate the rents that UK wind farms will earn from the proposed strike price, we need to 
model their cost of financing, and the revenue they will then earn over their first 15 years of 
life.  Both depend on the amount of energy the farms produce: revenues are directly linked 
to the amount of output, and the ratio of debt to equity that a project will require (and thus its 
WACC) depends on how much the output varies between years, as debt payments must be 
met even in a year with low output (such as 2010). 
For this modelling, we looked at the 303 onshore wind farms which are currently under 
construction or have obtained planning approval in the UK, as listed on the UKWED 
                                               
4 If the generator produces less than expected when the market as a whole is short of power, the generator will 
have to buy back the shortfall at the System Buy Price, which can be very high.  If the market as a whole has a 
surplus, however, the generator will pay the Market Index Price which reflects recent trading in the markets and 
should be close to the price in the day-ahead auction.  If the generator produces more than expected and the 
market also has a surplus, the generator will be paid the System Sell Price for the additional power – this may be 
negative but has been less penal, on average, than the System Buy Price. 
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database (RenewableUK, 2013).  These farms are likely to be the first to benefit from the 
proposed tariffs, and total 6.1 GW of capacity (adding 63% of the UK’s current capacity). 
To estimate the load factors these farms will obtain, we employed the ‘virtual wind turbine’ 
model developed at Imperial College Business School, which has been demonstrated in 
previous work (Staffell & Green, 2013).  This model takes hourly wind speeds from NASA’s 
MERRA reanalysis database, which are provided for a grid of points across the world at 
several heights above ground.  The model interpolates them to the wind farm’s site and 
extrapolates them up to the hub height of its wind turbines.  This gives an estimate of the 
wind speeds at the exact location and height of each proposed farm, which are then 
transformed into power outputs using the power curve of the turbine model that is due to be 
installed. 
The MERRA reanalysis is based on historic weather observations assimilated from 
thousands of sources, which are then processed in the GEOS-5 atmospheric model to give a 
complete spatial and temporal picture of the global weather system from 1979 to the present 
day (Rienecker, 2011).  Reanalysis can only give an estimate of the wind speeds at a given 
site; however, other researchers have found that the MERRA reanalysis is able to replicate 
the output of wind turbines in Northern Ireland more closely than ground-based hourly wind 
speed measurements made by the UK Met Office (Kubik, 2012).  This was verified in Staffell 
and Green (2013), finding that individual wind farms can be modelled to within ±5% accuracy 
on a month-by-month basis. 
For this study, we simulated the output that each planned wind farm would have produced if 
it had been operating from 1983 until 2012, giving 30 annual-average load factors for each 
farm.  These farms range from having average load factors of 18% to 40%, with the planned 
fleet averaging 27.5%, compared to the 26.4% historic average from the UK’s current fleet.  
The location and capacity of these farms is shown in Figure 2, while the range and variability 
of their load factors is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2: Map showing the location of the UK’s existing wind farms (black) and those under 
construction or with planning consent (green).  The size of each cross is proportional to the 
capacity of the farm. 
 
 
Figure 3: Spread of simulated load factors for the 303 planned wind farms in the UK, and 
their variation with the last 30 years of wind conditions. 
 
Table 1 gives the amount of capacity which is being planned, grouped by our predicted load 
factors.  We use the (undiscounted) average load factor over the first fifteen years of the 
station’s life, taking ageing into account.  Staffell and Green (2013) find that the typical 
station’s output declines by 1.6% of its average load factor per year after the first full year of 
its life.  For a station with an average load factor of 28% (as assumed in DECC’s 
calculations), this implies annual load factors that decline from 31% to 25% over the course 
of its life.  In the first year of operation, during which the station may be commissioning its 
final turbines and sorting out teething problems, we assume an output of 85% of the level 
reached in the station’s second full year. 
Table 1: Amounts of capacity planned or under construction in the UK (MW) 
Load Factor UK 
22% or less 265 
22.1 to 25% 1,183 
25.1 to 28% 1,559 
28.1 to 31% 1,802 
31.1 to 34% 383 
34.1% to 37% 358 
37.1% to 40% 529 
Over 40% 27 
Total 6,105 
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4 Estimated Rents 
We use a financial model to estimate the rents that each station would earn from its 15-year 
contract.  We follow DECC’s estimates for the latest ROC banding review, which had an 
average capital cost of £1,486 per kW of capacity, with fixed operating costs (including 
insurance and transmission charges) of £46 per kW per year, and variable costs of £3/MWh.  
We use a pre-tax cost of capital equal to 8.6% in real terms.  This is based on the figure of 
9.6% used for the ROC review, reduced to take account of the lower risks involved in selling 
with a fixed-price contract.5  
In each year, we take the expected output (ignoring year-to-year variations in load factor), 
multiplied by the contract price (which increases with the expected inflation rate of 2% a 
year) to give the station’s revenues.  Subtracting its operating costs gives the net income 
available for debt servicing and returns to equity.  We start with a debt share of 75%, but 
also check that the station is able to maintain an average debt cover ratio of 1.3, and that its 
debt cover ratio is unlikely to fall below 1.15.6  If the station is unable to maintain these cover 
levels, we increase the proportion of equity and adjust the weighted average cost of capital 
accordingly (without attempting to correct the cost of debt or of equity).   
We calculate the net present value of each project over the first fifteen years of its life, 
evaluated at its own cost of capital.  Our aim is to find the strike price that just covers the 
costs of a wind farm with a given load factor; in other words, the level that gives it a net 
present value of zero.  This is sufficient to pay back its debt and make an adequate profit on 
its equity, based on the weighted average cost of capital.  A project with an average load 
factor of 28% requires a strike price of £97/MWh to break even on this basis.  A project with 
a load factor of 34% would be able to break even with a strike price of only £81/MWh, while 
one with a 23% load factor would require a strike price of £118/MWh.  The results are shown 
in Table 2 below.  
On this basis, nearly half of the capacity currently being planned or built would be unable to 
cover its cost of capital with a strike price of £100/MWh, if it had DECC’s average costs.  We 
can also see that stations with high load factors would be economic (on the basis of average 
costs) at a strike price well below £100 – 1.6 GW of plant would cover its cost of capital at a 
strike price at least 10% below that proposed by DECC.   
Applying DECC’s chosen strike prices rather than those listed in Table 2 will give a rent to 
generators (or landowners) on favourable sites.  Multiplying the expected rent per MWh (the 
difference between the two prices) by the expected output from farms with an average load 
factor of 28% or greater, we get a cost of £103 million per year, with a net present value of 
£1.07 billion if discounted at 5% over 15 years. 
 
                                               
5 This figure appears not to take account of the current very low interest rates – if the capital structure of the 
station allows a 75% debt share, paying a nominal interest rate of 5.5% (250 basis points above the interbank 
rate for 15-year debt), and the Corporation Tax rate is 20%, then the real cost of equity capital would be about 
18%. 
6 This second check computes the income available for debt servicing if the station’s output is only equal to 70% 
of its annual average – an output at this level or lower occurs at least once in our 30-year data set for just under 
one third of our farms, implying that one in six might experience a problem in a fifteen-year lifetime.  Allowing 
debt to be paid from earlier surpluses would ease this constraint.  We find that changing this minimum level of 
output has little impact on our results. 
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Table 2: Load Factors, strike prices and capacity figures 
Load Factor 
(%) 
Strike Price needed 
(£/MWh) 
Potential Capacity 
(MW) 
Average Output 
(MWh per kW-year) 
20% or less over £135 63 Less than 1.56  
21% £129 94 1.63 
22% £123 176 1.71 
23% £118 599 1.79 
24% £113 453 1.87 
25% £109 373 1.94 
26% £105 487 2.02 
27% £101 610 2.10 
28% £97 735 2.18 
29% £94 633 2.26 
30% £91 234 2.33 
31% £88 431 2.41 
32% £86 93 2.49 
33% £83 167 2.57 
34% £81 126 2.64 
35% £79 189 2.72 
36% £76 14 2.80 
37% £74 70 2.88 
38% £73 371 2.96 
More than 39% £71 or less 185 Over 3.03 
 
5 Conclusions 
DECC have recently proposed supporting onshore wind farms with a strike price of 
£100/MWh.  This would be sufficient to allow a farm with an expected average output of 28% 
to cover its costs, given the average costs expected in the UK and a weighted average cost 
of capital of 8.6% (real, pre-tax).  This cost of capital is higher than in many other EU 
countries, although the UK is reducing the risks faced by renewable generators by changing 
to a feed in tariff from a tradable green certificate scheme. 
Given the high cost of capital, it would seem prudent for DECC to minimise the opportunity 
for generators to earn rents in excess of their costs, and a mechanism for doing so has been 
used in Germany for more than a decade.  Wind farms in Germany earn a high feed-in tariff 
for between five and twenty years, and then switch to a lower rate for the remainder (if any) 
of a twenty-year contract.  The higher their load factor, relative to the reference yield that 
their turbines could produce with standard wind conditions, the sooner they switch to the 
lower rate.  This helps to incentivise development on relatively poor sites which are needed 
to meet national targets for renewable output, whilst reducing the rents of stations on good 
sites. 
The UK could adopt some variant of the German scheme, and would be well-advised to do 
so.  If all stations had the average costs assumed by DECC, then nearly half of the capacity 
currently under construction or with planning permission would be uneconomic with a fixed 
strike price at £100/MWh.  Losing that capacity would make it harder to achieve our 
obligation under the EU’s renewables policy to provide 15% of our energy from renewable 
sources in 2020.  The economically viable capacity will earn rents, profits in excess of the 
payments needed to cover their costs, of around £100 million a year.  If we see stations at 
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lower-wind sites going ahead, this implies that DECC’s costs are over-estimated, and the 
rents to stations in windy locations may be even greater.  
Another difference, compared to the German scheme, is the shorter length of the contract.  
Under the German scheme, the price paid by a wind farm on a good site soon falls to €48.70 
per MWh, a level below the annual base load market price at the time the rates were set.  In 
other words, electricity consumers in Germany pay a high price for some years to allow wind 
farms in that country to recover their (high) fixed costs, but once those costs have been 
repaid, the consumers share in the benefit.  In the UK, electricity consumers are due to pay 
for the costs of wind farms during the early years, after which the owners will then be able to 
reap profits from a written-down asset with low variable costs.  Extending the length of the 
UK contracts, with a low price for the later years, would give a better allocation of costs and 
benefits.7  At the time of the investment decision, the price in years 16-20 of the wind farm’s 
life is unlikely to have much impact on the project’s net present value, and so steps can be 
taken to cap it without requiring much additional support in the earlier years.  From the 
perspective of electricity consumers in the 2030s, the savings could be significant.8  
One final feature of DECC’s latest proposals is that there is no longer an intention to claw 
back some of the proceeds of any refinancing.  While a project is under construction, its risks 
and cost of capital are relatively high.  Once construction is complete, the risks are lower and 
it can be possible to replace equity with debt.  A number of infrastructure schemes from the 
Private Finance Initiative have made significant profits for their owners when they were 
refinanced, and there have been suggestions that these have been excessive.  Excessive 
profits would, in our terms, count as an additional source of rents for developers.  Contract 
terms that clawed back these rents would be good for consumers and for economic 
efficiency.  If these profits are an appropriate reward for bearing construction risk, however, 
they would not contain significant rents, and so this is a question for further research. 
To sum up, however, the proposed contracts differ from the German model in two important 
respects, both likely to disadvantage electricity consumers.  The contracts do not 
differentiate between good and bad sites, reducing the number of schemes that can be 
financed, and creating excessive rents for farms in windy locations.  They are also too short, 
in that they give the developer a fully-depreciated generator with low variable costs and 
several years to make high profits from an asset already paid for by electricity consumers.  
DECC could do well to learn the lessons from the German experience with feed-in tariffs. 
 
 
                                               
7 A two-rate contract, which concentrates support in the earlier years, is more compatible with project financing in 
which lenders hope to be repaid over a relatively short period than a contract which offered an intermediate price 
for a longer period. 
8 The argument parallels that against extending the length of copyright, particularly for works already created: the 
artist does not get a meaningful incentive from royalties due in 50 to 70 years’ time, whereas the consumer loss 
from losing free access to works created between 50 and 70 years ago is important. 
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